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Schwartz:
BFP v. ResolutionTRUST
Trust Corporation:
Critiquing the Supreme Court
CORPORATION:
NOTE, BFP
V. RESOLUTION
CRITIQUING THE SUPREME COURT'S M/ETHOD OF DETERMINING "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE" WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF BANKRUPTCY FORECLOSURES
INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, the national economy was generally depressed, and

the result for property owners was devastating. During these years, the poor
economy and stagnant real estate market forced lenders to foreclose upon the

property of delinquent debtors, leaving debtors with little or no recourse. As
a result, many debtors have been forced to seek relief under the bankruptcy

laws in order to avoid complete financial obliteration.'
The United States Supreme Court did not help matters.

On May 23,

1994, the Supreme Court ended a conflict that had existed among the federal
courts for years by redefining the meaning of "reasonably equivalent value"

within the U.S. Bankruptcy Code fraudulent transfer provision, section
548(a)(2). 2 Under section 548(a)(2)(A), the bankruptcy trustee may avoid 3

1. Michael L. Welcott, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Transfers Under
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code:An Impetus To Changing State ForeclosureProceedings,
66 NEB. L. REv. 383, 383 (1987).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1984). Section 548 provides in part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchangefor such
transferor obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation; or
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in
business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an
unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured....
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) (emphasis added). The conflict in defining "reasonably equivalent
value" had existed among three circuits. In Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., the Fifth
Circuit, interpreting a provision of the old Bankruptcy Act analogous to § 548(a)(2), held that
a foreclosure sale that yielded at least 70% of the property's fair market value could be
considered "reasonably equivalent value." 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980). The court also
indicated in dicta that any such sale for less than 70% of fair market value should be invalidated.
Id. In Lawyer's Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid, the Ninth Circuit applied the Durrettrule, and
held that a determination of "reasonable equivalence" depends on whether there was compliance
with state foreclosure procedures. 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd 725 F.2d
1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 833 (1984). In In re Bundles, the court considered
the totality of circumstances in determining "reasonable equivalency." 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir.
1988). See infra section II.
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a property transfer by the debtor if the debtor received less than a "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange for the transfer.4
The Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation' held that "reasonably equivalent value" is not to be equated either with fair market value6 or
with fair foreclosure price.' Rather, the Court held that "reasonably
equivalent value" is any price received at the foreclosure sale, provided all
of the requirements of the state's foreclosure laws have been met.' The
majority reasoned that the price received at the foreclosure sale conclusively
establishes "reasonably equivalent value." 9 In effect, the Court held that,

"by the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended a peppercorn paid
at a noncollusive and procedurally regular foreclosure sale to be treated as
'reasonably equivalent' to the value of a California beachfront estate." 0
The implications of the Court's decision are potentially devastating, both
to mortgagors" and their creditors. As the dissent in BFP accurately points
out, a central premise of bankruptcy law is that a property transfer may be

3. In certain instances, the trustee in bankruptcy is given broad powers to avoid transfers
of property of the debtor. In addition to § 548, the Bankruptcy Code provides avoidance powers
in five other sections. Section 544(a)(1) allows the trustee to avoid any transfer of property of
the debtor if a creditor extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the
bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988). Section 545(1) allows the trustee to avoid
the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor if the lien becomes effective against the
debtor upon commencement of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 545(1)(A) (1988). Section
547(b)(4)(A) allows the trustee to avoid a transfer of an interest in property made on or within
ninety days of filing the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988). Section 549(a)(1) allows
the trustee to avoid a transfer of property of the debtor's estate that occurs after the commencement of the bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1) (1988). Section 724(a) allows a trustee
to avoid a lien that secures a claim of a kind specified in § 726(a)(4) of this title 11. 11 U.S.C.
§ 724(a) (1988). Section 726(a)(4) makes reference to claims for any fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising before the earlier of the
order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture,
or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such a
claim.
4. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
5. 114 S.Ct. 1757 (1994).
6. "Fair market value" is defined as the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597
(6th ed. 1990).
7. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1757.
8. Id.
9. Id. (Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ. joined).
10. Id. at 1767 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In 1984, Congress actually
considered, but did not enact, an amendment that said precisely what the Court in BFP held, that
the power to avoid or nullify the foreclosure sale is confined to foreclosures involving collusion
or procedural irregularity. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 360 (1983). The majority relied
on a purposely omitted amendment. Also, the phrase "fair market value" appears in only two
Bankruptcy Code provisions. Thus, the term of choice in the bankruptcy setting seems to be
"value," which has been read to mean "fair market value." Id. at 1768 n. 1.
11. A mortgagor is defined as one who, having all or some part of title to property, by
written instrument, pledges that property for some particular purpose such as security for a debt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1012 (6th ed. 1990).
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set aside because of its impact on other creditor or on the debtor's chances
for a fresh start.'" However, in light of the BFP holding, "reasonably
equivalent value" does not necessarily mean that a fair value is required
before the property may be transferred. Thus, upon foreclosure, the debtor
and creditor must each hope that the trustee sale will yield a fair price. If
the trustee sale fails to bring a price higher than the outstanding mortgage,
the creditors will lose all or a portion of their interest in the proceeds of the
sale. The result for the debtor is equally troublesome. Because the creditor
will be paid first from the proceeds of the trustee sale, a low price received
at the foreclosure sale will cause the debtor to lose any equity in the
foreclosed property.
Several commentators have suggested ways to obtain a fair price at a
foreclosure sale, and thus protect the debtor and his or her creditors."
However, no commentator has provided a method guaranteed to achieve
optimal prices at the foreclosure sale.
This Note suggests ways to establish such a guarantee, by providing a
statutory scheme that would protect both the creditors and the debtor. Under
this proposed scheme, the bankruptcy court would require a percentage of the
foreclosed property's fair market value to be obtained as a prerequisite to a
transfer of title. As will be discussed, such a practical approach is neither
an abuse of the power of the bankruptcy court 4 nor an overextension of
bankruptcy law beyond the traditional field of fraudulent transfers. 5
Section I of this Note presents an overview of the impact of bankruptcy
on real estate transactions in the United States. Specifically, this section
addresses the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and
focuses on a central premise of the bankruptcy avoidance powers: what state
law plainly allows as acceptable or "fair" as between a debtor and a creditor
may be set aside because of its impact on other creditors or on the debtor's
chances for a fresh start.16 Section II focuses on three predecessor cases
leading up to the decision in BFP: Durrettv. Washington NationalInsurance
Company, 7 Lawyer's Title Insurance Corporationv. Madrid," and Bundles
9 These three cases illustrate the divergent conclusions
v. Baker.1
courts have

12. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1774-75 (Souter, J., dissenting). ("When the prospect of such
avoidance is absent, indeed, the economic interests of a foreclosing mortgagee stand in stark
opposition to those of the debtor ... and of his other creditors."). Id. at 1775.
13. See infra section V.
14. For a discussion of bankruptcy courts as the most qualified entity to give "reasonably
equivalent value" sensible content in evaluating particular transfers upon foreclosure, see infra

section V.B.
15. For a discussion of fraudulent transfers with collusion, see infra Section I.A. For a
discussion of fraudulent transfers without collusion, see infra section I.B.
16. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1774-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
17. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aft'd 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 833 (1984).

19. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
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reached regarding the appropriate standard for defining "reasonably
equivalent value." Section III examines BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation,2' where the Court held that judicial invalidation of a foreclosure sale is
permissible only where there is irregularity in the conduct of the sale under
applicable state law, regardless of the price received at the sale.2 Section
IV addresses the implications of the Supreme Court's decision, focusing on
the Court's failure to adequately respond to the policy behind the Bankruptcy
Code. This Note argues that by not requiring fair market value at a
bankruptcy foreclosure sale, the Court neglected to recognize the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code: to maximize distribution of the debtor's estate for the
benefit of the creditors.' Section V provides a solution to the problems
caused by the decision, by requiring a transfer to be set aside when the
amount received at the foreclosure sale is not at least seventy percent of the
property's appraised value. Section VI provides a proposed amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code that protects the interest of creditors by equating
"reasonably equivalent value" with "fair market value." This Note concludes
that the BFP Court failed to adequately address the requirements of the
Bankruptcy Code, and that future court decisions must focus on the impact
a transfer of title will have on the creditor.
I. How BANKRUPTCY AFFECTS REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

In Biblical times, all debtors were allowed a new start.' Each seventh,
or sabbatical, year was a year of release from debts, where "every creditor
shall release that which he hath lent unto his neighbor." 24 As civilization
has progressed, society has taken a dimmer view of those who file for
bankruptcy. 5 For obvious reasons, creditors of those who file bankruptcy
are the most concerned group, because they potentially have as much to lose
as the bankrupt party.
Generally, there are three types of foreclosure proceedings: strict,
judicial, and power of sale.26 Strict foreclosure occurs when the mortgagee
is declared the owner of property following default without any sale of the

20. 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
21. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
22. Martin v. Phillips, 58 B.R. 128, 130 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986) (stating that the
purpose is to "preserve the assets of the bankruptcy estate").
23. MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCING:
A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 1065, 1065 n.1 (1991). "Even the land was given a new start:
every seventh year it would not be cultivated but would lie fallow, a process that helped
considerably to prevent exhaustion of the land and to enhance its fertility in the other years.
24. Id. See also Exodus 23:10 and Leviticus 25:4.
25. MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 23, at 1065.
26. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.11 (2nd
ed. 1985).
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premises.27 Judicial foreclosure refers to a foreclosure accomplished by
resort to the judicial process.'
Under this proceeding, the court is
intimately involved in the foreclosure process and acts as a neutral third

party, helping to some degree to achieve the maximum amount for the
property at the foreclosure sale.29 The judicial involvement, coupled with

other beneficial procedural guarantees such as notice, due process, and
adjudication of issues, might lead to the conclusion that judicial foreclosure

is the preferable method of foreclosing property. However, the costs
associated with judicial foreclosure cause most mortgagees to avoid its use
where legally permissible.3" In addition, the mortgagor is generally allowed
a statutory redemption right, 3 which allows the mortgagor to redeem
property that has been forfeited due to default on mortgage payments. 32
Thus, judicial foreclosures provide the potential for a "reentry" by the
mortgagor on property legitimately purchased by a third party.

The power of sale has been used historically as the most prevalent and
efficient method of foreclosure. 33 "Under this procedure, the mortgagee
conducts the sale under statutory guidelines intended to diminish the costs of
foreclosure and maximize the competitive bidding for the property. '34
"The power-of-sale foreclosure encourages higher bids by assuring the
purchaser at the sale that the bid is acceptable without the need for further

judicial action.

35

The primary difference between the judicial foreclosure

and the foreclosure by power of sale is that the court supervises the judicial

foreclosure, but not the power-of-sale foreclosure. 36 Also, the right of
redemption generally does not exist in the power-of-sale foreclosure.37

27. Strict foreclosure is used in only two states: Connecticut and Vermont. Id. at §§ 7.97. 10. Generally, strict foreclosure is accomplished by judicial action. Id.
28. Id. § 7.11.
29. Id.
30. Id. at §§ 7.11, 7.19.
31. Equity of redemption, also called a right of redemption, is defined as the right of the
mortgagor of property to redeem the property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1990).
Redemption rights are accorded to the judgment debtor or his successor. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 729.010 (West 1994). See infra note 173 for allowable redemption periods.
32. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.010 (West 1994).
33. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, at §§ 7.9-7.10.
34. Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances:
Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933, 976 (1985). "Moreover,
from the mortgagee's standpoint, the power-of-sale foreclosure is far less expensive and much
less time-consuming; it also provides greater certainty." Id.
35. Id. The assumption here is that the procedures for foreclosure are properly tailored to
produce an adequate price for the property. Id.
36. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, at §§ 7.11-7.19.
37. Id. "Many legislatures, including Alaska's, do not grant the debtor a right of
redemption from a non-judicial foreclosure sale in order to enhance the reliability of the title
acquired at the sale and thereby encourage participation in the bidding." Alden et al., Real
Property Foreclosure as a FraudulentConveyance: Proposals ForSolving the Durrett Problem,
38 BuS. LAW 1605, 1613 (1983).
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Aside from the disruption and delay, the basic interests of real estate
38
mortgagees should otherwise be generally unaffected by a foreclosure sale.
If the property has equity, that is, if it is worth more than the liens attached
to it, the property can be sold by the bankruptcy court to realize on the
equity. 39 After the sale, the mortgagee is paid the outstanding debt from
the proceeds of the sale. If there are creditors junior" to the mortgagee,
they will receive what is owed them if any proceeds remain after the debt to
the mortgagee or senior lienholder is paid. Finally, the debtor is entitled to
any proceeds remaining after each secured creditor 4' receives the obligation
owed. However, the mortgagee is not paid the outstanding debt where the
property is sold at the foreclosure sale for a price less than or equal to the
amount of indebtedness on the property. 42
The situation where a mortgagee receives less than the amount of the
indebtedness can result from three major causes. First, a sharp downturn in
market value of real estate will cause the property to sell for a price less than
the balance of the outstanding mortgage. Second, collusion between the
debtor and the purchasing party potentially results in a price far below the
property's market value. Third, a lower than fair market price received from
a foreclosure
sale will also lower the amount of recovery for the mortgag43
ee.
A. Mortgage Foreclosuresas FraudulentTransfers
The primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer'
38. MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 23, at 1066. Because court supervision is not
required, the nonjudicial foreclosure is more efficient, although the mortgagor or another
interested party may initiate a review of the proceedings. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 976.
39. MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 23, at 1066.
40. A junior interest is a legal right which is subordinate to another's legal right as applied
to property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 851 (6th ed. 1990). A junior creditor is one whose
claim or demand accrued at a date later than that of a claim or demand held by another creditor,
or whose claim ranks below other creditors in rights to the debtor's property. Id. at 257.
41. A secured creditor is a creditor who holds some special pecuniary assurance of payment
of his debt, such as a mortgage, collateral, or lien. Id. at 1354.

42. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 26, §§ 7.11-7.19.
43. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), discussed
infra at section II.A. The Durrett court held that a foreclosure sale that yielded 57% of the
property's fair market value could be set aside as a fraudulent transfer, because it did not yield
a "reasonably equivalent value." Id. at 203.
44. The Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions regard as a constructive fraud any
transfers made while the transferor is insolvent within a year before bankruptcy for a
consideration not "reasonably equivalent" to what the property being transferred is worth. II
U.S.C. § 548 (1988). Fraudulent conveyance laws were designed to protect creditors from a
debtor's intentional action in placing his property beyond a creditor's reach. Alden, supra note
37, at 1605. "However, it has been argued (not always successfully) that a public foreclosure
sale is designed to provide a state-sanctioned method for determining value and that the price
obtained at a noncollusive foreclosure sale should, therefore, be deemed to be reasonably
equivalent . . . to the value of the property." MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 23, at 978.
Still, three circuits have held that noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sales may be set
aside as fraudulent transfers where the price paid was less than "reasonably equivalent' to the
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provision is to protect the debtor's estate for the benefit of unsecured
creditors.45 Traditionally, the objective behind the fraudulent transfer laws
was to prevent a debtor from transferring the estate's assets either to other
creditors as preferential treatment or to "friendly hands" for safekeeping.'
To protect against such a transfer, "section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
allows a trustee to avoid a transfer by a debtor to any person if, for example,
the debtor did not receive 'reasonably equivalent value' for the property." 47
Consider the following hypothetical: a developer owns a parcel of
property and has suffered financial losses. Concerned that creditors may
obtain judgments and a levy on his property, the developer executes a
mortgage in favor of his brother-in-law that is recorded against the property.
When the creditors start closing in, the developer deliberately defaults under
the mortgage. His brother-in-law forecloses, buys the property at the
foreclosure sale for the mortgage balance, and transfers the property to a
corporation of which the developer is president.4 8 The developer will be
unsuccessful in attempting to put his property out of the reach of his
creditors.4 9 A debtor who voluntarily transfers an interest in real property,
with the actual intent to deprive his creditors of the full value of that interest,
has committed a fraudulent conveyance.5 0
Section 548(a) consists of two subsections.
Section 548(a)(1) 5 1
authorizes the bankruptcy trustee to avoid a transfer of the debtor's property
where actual fraudulent intent is proven. Section 548(a)(2) 52 provides for
avoidance regardless of whether intent to defraud exists. Although it is
possible for a debtor and a secured creditor to conspire in a foreclosure
proceeding to intentionally defraud other creditors, most foreclosures do not

value of the property. Durrett v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980); Abramson
v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cit. 1981); In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815
(7th Cir. 1988); In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984).
45. BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE, § 25.03[1] (1991).
46. Id.
47. Martha Sewell, Avoidance of ForeclosureSales Under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Balancing of Interests, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1011 (1992). In addition to
"reasonably equivalent value," the trustee also must show that (1) a transfer of a debtor's
interest occurred; (2) the transfer was made on or within one year of the filing of the petition;
and (3) the debtor was insolvent on the transfer date or became insolvent as a result of the
transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
48. MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 23, at 1043.
49. See Lefkowitz v. Finkelstein Trading Corp., 14 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (The
transfer of property of an insolvent corporation effected by means of purchase of such property
at a fraction of its fair value and immediate resale to family of former owner held fraudulent and
void as to creditors and trustee in bankruptcy for whom no assets had been left).
50. See Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 936. See also ACLI Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 653
F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Rhoades, an attorney conveyed a large tract of land to his
law partner, who was also his sister, the day before a large judgment was entered against him.
The transfer was set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Id.
51. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
52. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2) (vest Supp. 1993).
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involve actual intent to defraud. 3 "In most cases, foreclosing creditors are
merely enforcing their security rights against a defaulting debtor." 4
In the hypothetical case discussed above, the developer clearly attempted
to fraudulently convey his property to his brother-in-law in order to avoid a
trustee sale. But, would the result be different if the transfer involved no
collusion, and the property still did not fetch its fair market value? Whether
fraudulent transfers may occur without collusion has been a fundamental
consideration in construing the requirement of "reasonably equivalent value"
in section 548(a)(2).1
B. Section 548(a): FraudulentTransfer Without Collusion?

The purpose of section 548 is to preserve bankrupt debtors' estates for
fair distribution to all creditors. 6 With that in mind, suppose that a debtor
owned a property with a fair market value of $500,000 and a mortgage
balance of $300,000. When the debtor defaulted on her payments and filed
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee sold the property to a bidder who bid
$100,000. Can the bankruptcy trustee have the transfer set aside on the
theory that the property was fraudulently transferred under section 548(a)(2),
even though there was no collusion in the sale?
The answer should be a resounding "yes." The primary goal of federal
fraudulent transfer law is to protect the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of
unsecured creditors from a transfer of estate property to any person for less
than "reasonably equivalent value." 57 However, as will be discussed in

53. Vie S. Lam, Avoidability of Foreclosure Sales Under Section 548(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code: Revisiting the Transfer Issue and Standardizing Reasonable Equivalency, 68
WASH. L. REv. 673, 674 (1993). This is true even though forced-sale prices are generally
lower than market prices. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
54. Id. (citing THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET. AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS,
§ 16.05, at 16-71 n.6 (rev. ed. 1991)). The preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code (11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1983)) permits a trustee to avoid pre-petition transfers that have the effect of
preferring one creditor over others by giving the favored creditor more than its respective share
of the debtor's assets under the bankruptcy law. Id.
55. Some critics have taken the position that the requirement of fair market value is
properly sensitive to the policy underlying § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Alden et
al. supra note 37, at 1610.
56. See Grissom v. Johnson (In re Grissom), 955 F.2d 1440, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the purpose of § 548 is to prevent depletion of bankruptcy estates); Barrett v.
Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 939 F.2d 20, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1991); Bundles v. Baker
(In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the purpose is to "preserve the
assets of the [bankruptcy] estate"); Hen!y-Luqueer Properties, Inc. v. Mayo (In re HenryLuqueer Properties, Inc.), 145 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the purpose
is to "foster an equitable distribution of the debtor's property"); Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank
(In re Ruebeck), 55 B.R. 163, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) ("The pervading intent. . . behind
the Bankruptcy Code . . . is equitable distribution.").
57. See Sewell, supra note 47, at 1011.
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Section III, infra, the creditors will share the $100,000.58

The debtor will

58. See infra Section Hm. Under the Bankruptcy Code, certain creditors are entitled to more
favorable distribution of the debtor's assets. For example, tax liens will always have priority
over any creditor upon distribution. Creditors who have a perfected security interest under
Article 9 of the U.C.C. are entitled to the repayment of the full value of their collateral.
However, employees of the debtor are entitled to payment of their wage claims before most
other creditors receive any distribution. Distribution to creditors, however, is subject to any
statutory exemption rights the debtor may have. Under § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this
title, and any fees and charges assessed against the estate under
chapter 123 of title 28.
(2) Second, unsecured claims allowed under section 502(o of this
title.
(3) Third, allowed unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $4,000
for each individual or corporation, as the case may be, earned within
90 days before the date of the filing of the petition or the date of the
cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs first, for(A) wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay earned by an
individual; or
(B) sales commissions earned by an individual or by a
corporation with only I employee, acting as an independent contractor in the sale of goods or services for the
debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business if,
and only if, during the 12 months preceding that date,
at least 75 percent of the amount that the individual or
corporation earned by acting as an independent contractor in the sale of goods or services was earned from the
debtor;
(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee
benefit plan(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days
before the date of the filing of the petition or the date
of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever
occurs first; but only
(B)for each such plan, to the extent of(i) the number of employees covered by each such
plan multiplied by $4,000; less
(ii) the aggregate amount paid to such employees
under paragraph (3) of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf of such
employees to any other employee benefit plan.
(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims of persons(A) engaged in the production or raising of grain...
(6) Sixth, allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of
$1,800 for each such individual, arising from the deposit, before the
commencement of the case, of money in connection with the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the
personal, family or household use of such individuals, that were not
delivered or provided.
(7) Seventh, allowed claims for debts to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of
such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination
made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental
unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that such
debt-
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not realize any of the equity she has placed into the house, with the exception
of any statutory homestead exemption. 9 Applying the BFP decision, if
$100,000 was the highest bid at the sale, that amount is presumed to be
"reasonably equivalent value" for a property with a fair market value of
$500,000, provided there was no irregularity in the sale.
1. The Legislative History of Section 548(a)
Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 replaced and simplified
section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1878.' The Commission on the
(A) is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by
operation of law, or otherwise; or
(B) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the
nature of alimony, maintenance or support.
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units; only to
the extent that such claims are for(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of
the filing of the petition for which a return, if required,
is last due, including extensions, after three years
before the date of the filing of the petition...
(9) Ninth, allowed unsecured claims based upon any commitment by
the debtor to a Federal depository institutions regulatory agency (or
predecessor to such agency) to maintain the capital of an insured
depository institution...
11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). See infra note 59.
59. The "homestead exemption" is one of the most common state exemptions, where
individuals are allowed to exempt their "homestead" from creditor attachment. In California,
The amount of the homestead exemption is one of the following: (1) Fifty thousand
dollars unless the judgment debtor or spouse of the judgment debtor who resides in
the homestead is a person described in paragraph (2) or (3). (2) Seventy-five thousand
dollars if the judgment debtor or spouse of the judgment debtor who resides in the
homestead is at the time of the attempted sale of the homestead a member of a family
unit, and there is at least one member of the family unit who owns no interest in the
homestead or whose only interest in the homestead is a community property interest
with the judgment debtor.(3) Seventy-five thousand dollars if the judgment debtor or
spouse of the judgment debtor who resides in the homestead is at the time of the
attempted sale of the homestead any one of the following: (A) A person 65 years of
age or older (B) A person physically or mentally disabled and as a result of that
disability is unable to engage in substantial gainful employment, . . .(C) A person
55 years of age or older with a gross annual income of not more than fifteen thousand
dollars or, if the judgment debtor is married, a gross annual income, including the
gross annual income of the judgment debtor's spouse, of not more than twenty
thousand dollars and the sale is an involuntary sale.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730(a) (West Supp. 1995). It should be noted, however, that the
debtor will not be entitled to the full homestead exemption if the debtor's equity in the property
is less than the statutory homestead exemption. In such a case, the debtor will be entitled to
exempt from property of the estate only the amount of equity in the property. Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). The introduction to the Act provided: "This
section is derived in large part from the section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act [section 107(d) of
former Title 11]. It permits the trustee to avoid transfers by the debtor in fraud of his creditors.
Its history dates from the statute of 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570)." S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
CAL.
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Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Congress to recommend
changes in the bankruptcy laws, explained in its report: "Section 67(d) is
modeled upon the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The Commission
believes that it has worked satisfactorily and it does not recommend any
substantial changes therein, except a simplification of its extremely complex
language. "6
Accordingly, although some subsequent changes were made, the current
law is largely a simplification of the old statute.62 However, substitution
of the term "transfer" for "conveyance" sparked considerable debate by
courts 63 and commentators. 6' The most important change was the replacement of the phrase "fair consideration" with "reasonably equivalent
value. ' 65 The Bankruptcy Code does not define "reasonably equivalent
value," and the debate over the definition, beginning with the Durrett
decision, triggered a long-standing split among the circuits.66
The legislative history of both section 548 and its predecessor, section
67, sheds little light on how "reasonably equivalent value" should be
defined.67 Neither of the sections contain reference to its meaning.
However, read in its literal terms, section 548 potentially has the power to

Sess. (1978).
61.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973).
62.

See W. COLLIER, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 548.01[1], at 548-8 (15th ed. 1994).

The Bankruptcy Code makes few substantive changes in prior law. However, the first sentence
of former § 67(e) provided the trustee with an arsenal of its own. Id. at 548-5. "This sentence,
in condemning 'conveyances ... with the intent ... to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,'

utilized common law terms, which were to have uniform application in bankruptcy courts
throughout the land." Id. (citations omitted)
63. See, e.g., Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) ("transfer" relevant to § 548 occurs at perfection
of the deed of trust); Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 22 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982)
("transfer" in the context of § 548 occurs at execution and recordation of the deed of trust).
64. David B. Simpson, Real PropertyForeclosures:The Fallacy ofDurrett, 19 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J.73, 78-79 (1984) (arguing that while a transfer of a property interest takes place
at foreclosure, it is an interest inferior to that transferred to the mortgagee of the mortgage).
65. See Sewell, supra note 47, at 1017. Mention has been made of the fact that former
§ 67(2)(a) declared a transfer during or resulting in insolvency of the transferor for less than a
fair consideration to be fraudulent only as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer. No
such limitation exists under § 548(a)(2). See, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 62, at 548-53. "Section
548(a)(2) does not refer either to creditors existing at the time of the transfer or obligation or
to future creditors." Id. at 548-50.
66. See infra section II. The Fifth Circuit, in Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co.,
interpreted a provision of the old Bankruptcy Act analogous to § 548(a)(2) and held that a
foreclosure sale that yielded 57% of the property's fair market value could be set aside. 621
F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980). The court indicated in dicta that any such sale for less than 70%
of fair market value should be invalidated. The Ninth Circuit, in Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v.
Madrid, applied the "Durrett rule," and held that a determination of "reasonable equivalence"
depends on whether there was compliance with state foreclosure procedures. 21 B.R. 424
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit, in In re Bundles, considered the totality of
circumstances in determining reasonable equivalency. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
67. Sewell, supra note 47, at 1018.
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set aside a foreclosure sale if the price received is so inadequate that it is
deemed to be less than "reasonably equivalent value."6"
Still, without a definition provided in the Code itself, and with nothing
conclusive in the legislative history to guide them, the courts have been free
to follow their own reasoning in determining the proper method for defining
"reasonably equivalent value." The respective positions taken have favored
two conflicting objectives: (1) protecting the mortgagor's equity, a purpose
served by federal bankruptcy law;69 and (2) ensuring the certainty and
finality
of real estate foreclosures, a purpose traditionally served by state
70
law.

In reviewing these competing policy considerations, the ultimate
resolution of this issue should be based upon the underlying principle of both
bankruptcy and foreclosure law: protecting equity for the benefit of
unsecured or undersecured creditors.
2. The Equity-Protecting Purpose of Section 548(a)(2)
As noted earlier, the purpose of section 548 is to preserve bankruptcy
estates for fair distribution to all creditors. 7' To further this purpose,
section 548 seeks to preserve the debtor's equity in foreclosed properties.7
Such protection is needed because the typical foreclosure sale yields far less
than the fair market value of the property being sold,73 which results in a
windfall to the purchaser at the trustee sale at the expense of the mortgagor's
unsecured or undersecured creditors.74 "It might be acceptable to approve
as final a foreclosure sale at far less than market value when the only party
to suffer is the debtor." 75 This is especially true when the debtor has
"allowed a valuable property interest to be sold at a public sale, despite

68. Id. at 1012.
69. Id. at 1020 ("Section 548 is intended to ensure a 'fair return on the debtor's assets for
the benefit of all [unsecured] creditors.'" (quoting Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In
re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989))).
70. Id. at 1013-14. Mortgage foreclosure law compensates the mortgagee for the value of
its investment, the effect of which is to disregard the debtor's unsecured creditors. DUNAWAY,
supra note 45, at § 25.03[1].
71. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
72. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1771 n.10 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("bankruptcy law affords mortgagees distinct and presumably adequate protections
for their interest . . . along with the general promise that the debtors estate will, effectively, be
maximized in the interest of creditors.").
73. Most commentators and practitioners would agree that the foreclosure sale price is not
the fair market value of the property because the nature of the sale discourages third parties from
participating. See, e.g., Gary Goff, FairMarket Value: A Primer ForTexas Legal Practice, 15
TEX. TECH L. REv. 637 (1984).
74. See James B. Davis & Steven A. Standiford, ForeclosureSale as Fraudulent Transfer

Under the Bankruptcy Code: A ReasonableApproach to Reasonably Equivalent Value, 13 REAL

ESTATE L.J. 201, 212 (1984).

75. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 960.
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ample opportunity to redeem the property or reinstate the loan. "76 However, it is unacceptable "to allow an entity purchasing the property at a

foreclosure sale to walk away with a windfall, while unsecured creditors are
forced to bear the cost of the disproportionate exchange." '

A prudent

unsecured creditor who has examined his debtor's financial statements prior
to extending credit has no control over the debtor subsequently mortgaging

his property.7" However, such prudence will not protect the unsecured
creditor from loss. "The policies embodied in section 548(a)(2) are designed
to prevent this inequitable result."'79
Applying section 548 to foreclosure sales can preserve equity for the
debtor and his creditors where the debtor subsequently files bankruptcy. By
avoiding a foreclosure sale, the bankruptcy trustee gains an opportunity to
resell the property at a price which presumably will more closely reflect a
value "reasonably equivalent" to the property's true market value. This
allows the trustee to recoup at least some of the debtor's equity for the

benefit of other creditors.8"

Despite the consensus on, and the frequent reference to, the purpose of

section 548(a)(2), courts have strongly disagreed on what the statutory
language of "reasonably equivalent value" ought to mean to serve the

statutory purpose.8 '

II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE"
PRIOR TO

BFP

Prior to the BFP decision, there were three major approaches to

determining what constitutes "reasonably equivalent value." The first
approach measured the foreclosure sale price against a benchmark percentage

76.
77.
78.
suggest

Id.
Id.
But see Davis & Standiford, supra note 74, at 232. Mr. Davis and Mr. Standiford
that

requiring an unsecured creditor to assume that a debtor might subsequently mortgage
his property is not inconsistent with the purpose of the fraudulent transfer laws.
Unsecured creditors need not assume the risk that their debtor will make an
improvident transfer while insolvent; they need to assume only that the debtor might
obtain a bona fide mortgage loan in which the mortgage given is reasonably
equivalent to the money borrowed. Such a loan causes no harm to an unsecured
creditor because it does not deplete the value of the debtor's estate.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 960.
80. Most debtors facing foreclosure will have at least some "equity" in the property.
Equity in this context is "the amount or value of a property above the total liens or charges...
s, an equity of $5,000 may come about by having fair market value property of $20,000 with
debt of $15,000." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 584 (5th ed. 1979). See COLLIER, supra note
62, § 548.
81. See infra section II.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994

13

CaliforniaWESTERN
Western Law
Review,
Vol. 31 [1994], No. 2, Art. 6
CALIFORNIA
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.

31

of the fair market value established by the appraised value of a foreclosed

property. 2 The second approach focused on compliance with state foreclosure procedures.83 The third approach examined all relevant factors
surrounding the sale in view of some equitable or commercially reasonably
standard. 4
A. The Durrett Rule: Requiring a Seventy Percent "Benchmark" to
Protect the Debtor and Creditor
Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Company was the first

example of a court exercising its ability to set aside a foreclosure sale as a
fraudulent transfer because of a lack of fair consideration.'
Although
Durrettwas decided under the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code,
the case has had a 86
lasting impact on the issue of the meaning of "reasonably
equivalent value.
The circumstances of the Durrettcase arose from the debtor's default on

a note executed by the debtor in the amount of $180,000, and secured
through a deed of trust on his property.' Upon default on the note and
subsequent foreclosure sale, the property was sold for $115,400.88 This
amount represented 57.7% of the fair market value of the property, and the

debtor/trustee effectively suffered a loss on the property of more than
$84,000.89

In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit in Durrettconcluded that
a foreclosure sale price of $115,400 was not fair consideration for property
with an estimated fair market value of $200,000.
The court concluded

82. See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also Lam, supra note 53, at 678.
83. See, e.g., Lawyer's Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). See
also Lam, supra note 53, at 678.
84. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Lam, supra
note 53, at 678.
85. See Simpson, supra note 64, at 73.
Prior to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in Durrett, bankruptcy
courts had not invoked their statutory authority to avoid fraudulent conveyances to
set aside, on grounds of inadequacy of consideration, a foreclosure sale completed
prior to a debtor's bankruptcy so long as the underlying mortgage had itself been
given in a transaction immune from attack as a fraudulent transfer.
Id. (citation omitted).
86. William A. Walsh, In Re Bundles: FindingA New BasisForDetermining "Reasonable
Equivalent Value" Under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 DEPAUL L. RFV. 175, 182
(1990).
87. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 202-03.
88. Id. at 203. The property was purchased by the only party to appear at the sale.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 204.
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that the debtor had not received "fair equivalent" value for the property. 9'

In dictum, the court noted that it could not locate a single federal case
upholding a transaction under section 67(d) where a trustee/debtor received

less than seventy percent of the fair market value in consideration.'

As a

result of this dictum, Durretthas been said to embody the proposition that

a foreclosure sale for less than seventy percent of the fair market value is not
a sale for "reasonably equivalent value" under Section 548(a)(2). 93
Support for the "Durrettrule" was far from unanimous. Many courts
and commentators reasoned that a rule requiring a percentage of fair market

value as a prerequisite to transfer would chill foreclosure sale bidding.94
Still, the decision arguably encourages reform of the entire state foreclosure

process.
B. The MadridApproach: Requirement of Compliance
With State Procedureas the DeterminativeFactorfor

"Reasonably Equivalent Value"
Under the Madrid95 approach, the court held that the foreclosure price
is not to be considered within the context of section 548(a)(2).96 Instead,
the court focused on whether the foreclosure sale complied with the
applicable state foreclosure procedures. 7 Under this approach, a court will
conclusively presume that a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure
sale yields a "reasonably equivalent value.""
91. As predecessor to § 548, § 67(d) required a "fair equivalent" value. This has been
construed as having the same meaning as "reasonably equivalent value." See Sewell, supra note
47, at 1017.
92. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
93. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1989) ("Most courts have interpreted Durrett as standing for the proposition that
'reasonably equivalent value' . . . is present if the sale achieves at least 70 percent of the fair
market value ....") Id. See also Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re

Barrett), 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991), where the court allowed a foreclosure sale for 69.5% of
the market value.

94. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Coppel & Lewis A. Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established
Law of "Transfer," 100 BANKING L.J. 676, 677 (1983) (theorizing that Durrett made it
impossible to "convey clear and marketable title at foreclosure sales. . ."); Simpson, supra note
62, at 73 ("The rule of Durrett must have sent shock waves throughout the secured lending
community .... [T]he effect of Durrett has been to jeopardize the security of all titles acquired
through foreclosure sales."); Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 22 B.R. 1017, 1018 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1982) (stating that Durrett is inconsistent with the rationale of the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Evans v. Valley West Shopping Center, 567 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1978)). But see
Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 B.R. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982) ("while Durrett's application of bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance law to a foreclosure
sale may have been unprecedented, there is nothing novel in avoiding transfers under bankruptcy
law which are valid under state law.").
95. Lawyer's Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982).

96. Id. at 427.

97. Id.
98. Id.
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The facts of Madrid are fairly comparable to those of Durrett. The
debtor in Madridhad purchased a parcel of property by borrowing the entire
purchase price and executing both a first and second deed of trust as security
for the loans.99 When the debtor defaulted, the trustee under the second

trust deed sold the property at a foreclosure sale, where the property was
purchased for sixty-four percent to sixty-seven percent of the property's fair
market value."° Seven days after the foreclosure sale, the debtor filed
bankruptcy and sought to avoid the transfer under section 548(a).' 0
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madridheld that "the consideration
received at a non-collusive, regularly-conducted public sale satisfies the
'reasonably equivalent value' requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)
... ,,'l Relying on prior state law decisions, the court concluded that
inadequacy of price alone was insufficient grounds for avoiding a foreclosure
sale. 3 The court added that "there must be in addition proof of some
element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about
the inadequacy of price.""

Commentators and courts note several arguments favoring the Madrid
approach. For example, the Madrid approach narrowly construes section
548, which prevents preemption in an area of law traditionally controlled by
the states, thus preserving the integrity of state real estate law. 05 Also,
since the Code does not define "reasonably equivalent value," this construction arguably complies with the Code.0 6

99. Id. at 425.
100. Id. The property was purchased by the only bidder at the sale, who purchased the
property subject to the first deed of trust and an amount necessary to liquidate the indebtedness
secured by the second trust deed. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 427 (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989 (Nev. 1963)) ("If we consider
the question of price adequacy in the context of foreclosure law we find, not surprisingly, that
mere inadequacy will not upset a foreclosure sale."). Id.
104. Id. (quoting Oller v. Sonoma County Land Title Co., 290 P.2d 880, 882 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963)). By requiring "some element of fraud," the Madrid court reintroduced the good
faith requirement that the drafters had abandoned in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
gave a regularly conducted non-collusive foreclosure a presumption of innocence. Id.
According to the Madrid court, a debtor's demonstration of some indication of fraud or "bad
faith" is the only way to overcome this presumption and set aside the transfer. Id.
105. Bennett v. Genoa AG Ctr., Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 140, 146 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1992). The court in Bennett held that the federal standard of reasonable equivalence, at least as
applied to regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sales, should be consonant with
applicable state foreclosure law. See also Zajac v. Federal Land Bank, 909 F.2d 1181, 1183
(8th Cir. 1990) (illustrating that a broad interpretation of "reasonably equivalent value" allows
for § 548(a)(2) to encroach into state substantive foreclosure law).
106. Mark E. Budnitz, The Duties Imposed by Bankruptcy Courts Upon Mortgagees at
Foreclosure Sales: How to Avoid Avoidance Under Section 548, 46 BUs. LAW. 1183, 1185
(1991). Budnitz also notes that, to the extent bankruptcy courts are content with state procedures
and do not impose additional costly requirements, the holding in Madrid allows mortgagees to
operate more efficiently and provide more and cheaper credit to homeowners. Id.
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Absent collusion, intentional fraud, or violation of state foreclosure
procedures, the Madridcourt held that a foreclosure sale will stand. This is
true even if the price realized falls substantially below the fair market value
of the property foreclosed. 107
C. The Bundles Analysis: A Case-By-Case Determination Consideringthe
Totality of the Circumstances

Dissatisfaction with both the Durrettseventy percent rule and the Madrid
state-procedural approach became evident when the Eighth Circuit refused
to adopt either standard and instead required a case-by-case evidentiary
Also dissatisfied with the
determination of reasonably equivalent value.'
approaches of Durrettand Madrid, the Seventh Circuit, in 1988, formulated
a third alternative which takes 0a 9middle-of-the-road approach to interpreting
"reasonably equivalent value."
In Bundles v. Baker, the Seventh Circuit
advised that courts should be aware of the purpose of section 548, which is
to preserve the assets of the estate, while also giving respect to state
foreclosure proceedings.' "
In Bundles, the debtor was unable to meet his mortgage payments due
to various financial and health problems. At the foreclosure sale, the
debtor's property was purchased for $5,066.80."' The value of the
property at the time of sale was $15,500."' The Seventh Circuit noted that
while fair market value marks an appropriate starting point for analysis, the
determination of "reasonably equivalent value" cannot be limited to a simple
comparison of sale price to fair market value." 3

Instead, the court

concluded ultimate focus must be on the fair market value as affected by the
foreclosure sale.' "4 Consequently, the Bundles court found that there is a
rebuttable presumption that the foreclosure price is the property's "reasonably equivalent value."" 5 The presumption can be rebutted by examining
the entire transaction to determine whether the "procedures employed were
calculated not only to secure for the mortgagee the value of its interest, but
also to return to the debtor-mortgagor his equity in the property.""6

107. Id.
108. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The Hulm court rejected the state
procedural approach of Madrid and conspicuously ignored Durrett.
109. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 817
112. Id.
113. Id. at 824.
114. Id. at 825.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 824.
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When reviewing the transaction as a whole, the Bundles court suggested
evaluating factors such as: (1) whether there was a fair appraisal of the
property; (2) whether the property was advertised widely; and (3) whether
competitive bidding was encouraged."' Since 1988, three circuit courts of
appeals have
adopted the totality of circumstances test advocated in
8
Bundles. 11

Ill. BFP v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION:

PRESUMPTION OF "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE" WHERE SALE IS CONDUCTED IN
COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW

The U.S. Supreme Court in BFPparted from the positions taken by both
the fifth circuit in Durrett and the Seventh Circuit in Bundles. The Court
held that both Durrettand Bundles wrongly refer to fair market value as the
benchmark against which determination of "reasonably equivalent value" is
to be measured. 9 Such reference, according to the Court, is not consistent with the text of the Bankruptcy Code,' 2 because "fair
market value"
2
does not appear in section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.' '
In BFP, the petitioners took title to a California home subject to a deed
of trust in favor of Imperial Savings Association."
After the petitioners
were unable to continue payments and the loan was in default, the home was
purchased for $433,000 at a properly conducted foreclosure sale." BFP
soon petitioned for bankruptcy and filed a complaint to set aside the sale as
a fraudulent transfer.'24 BFP claimed that the home was worth over

117. Id. See also National Envtl. Sys. Corp. v. Long Pond Realty Trust (In re National
Envtl. Sys. Corp.), 111 B.R. 4 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989) (examining the extent of competitive
bidding and effect of giving notice to local brokers).
118. See Grissom v. Johnson (In re Grissom), 955 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1992) (clarifying
its earlier decision in Walker v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 888 F.2d 90 (11th Cir. 1989));
Barrett v. Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 939 F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1991); Cooper v.
Ashley Communications, Inc. (In re Morris Communications N.C.), 914 F.2d 458 (4th Cir.
1990).
119. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994).
120. Id.
121. Id. In contrast, Justice Scalia noted that § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(a)(2) (1988), dealing with debtors' exemptions, "specifically provides that, for purposes
of that section, 'value' means 'fair market value' as of the date of the filing of the petition."
Id.
122. Id. at 1759.
123. Id.
Respondent Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) [acted] in this case as receiver of
Imperial Federal Savings Association (Imperial Federal), which was organized
pursuant to a June 22, 1990, order of the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and into which RTC transferred certain assets and liabilities of Imperial. The
Director previously had appointed RTC as receiver of Imperial.
Id. at 1759 n.1.
124. Id. at 1759.
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$725,000 when sold and, thus, was not exchanged for a "reasonably equivalent value" under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code." 2

The

bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the purchaser.Y6 The
bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the dismissal,

7

holding that consider-

ation received in a non-collusive and regularly conducted, nonjudicial

foreclosure sale"z establishes "reasonably equivalent value" as a matter of

law.

9

The court of appeals affirmed,"' and the Supreme Court held

that "reasonably equivalent value" is the price received at the foreclosure

sale, so long as all of the requirements of the state's foreclosure laws have
been complied with. 3 '
In reaching its conclusion, the majority, under Justice Scalia,' 32
focused on two identifying factors. First, the Court looked at the words
"reasonably equivalent value," and determined that no textual guidance

existed that would equate "reasonably equivalent value" to "fair market
value."'3 In addition, the Court noted that until the value of a foreclosed
property is determined, one cannot establish whether the value received in
exchange for the foreclosed property is "reasonably equivalent value. " "
Second, even if such guidance existed, "reasonable equivalence" cannot
mean "fair market value" where there is a forced sale.' 35 This is because
"fair market value" presumes market conditions that, by definition, do not
exist in the context of a forced sale.'36

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 132 B.R. 748 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
128. See supra notes 7-10.
129. 132 B.R. 748 (1991).
130. h re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992).
131. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1765.
132. Id. at 1759.
133. Id. at 1761.
134. Id. at 1766. The majority noted that three possible measures exist as to how to valuate
a foreclosed property: fair market value, reasonable-forced sale price, and the foreclosure price
itself. Id.
135. Id. at 1761.
136. Id. See also Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to PriceInadequacy in
MortgageForeclosureSales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843, 848 (1980). "Foreclosure sale prices are
often greatly below actual fair market values because they reflect the fact that the sale is a forced
sale rather than an arm's length, free market sale between a willing buyer and a willing seller."
Id. (citing Girard Trust Bank v. Castle Apts., Inc., 379 A.2d 1144, 1146 (Del. Super. Ct.
1977); Maule Indus. v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 91 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1956); Aaron v.
Life Ins. Co., 226 S.E.2d 96, 98 (Ga. App. 1976) (Clark, J., concurring); Levy v. BroadwayCarmen Bldg. Corp., 8 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Ill. 1937); Gilbert v. Lusk, 106 N.E.2d 404, 413
(Ind. App. 1952); Fox v. Jackson, 64 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. App. 1946); Commercial Bank v.
Madsen, 236 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1951).
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A. The Majority'sReasoning: No Textual Guidance Equating
"ReasonablyEquivalent Value" To "FairMarket Value"
In reaching its definition of "reasonably equivalent value," the Court
found that no textual guidance existed which would allow "reasonably
equivalent value" to equate to "fair market value." In fact, the Court noted
that section 548 seemingly
goes out of its way to avoid the standard term,
37
"fair market value."1
The Court reasoned that because the phrase "fair market value" appears
in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress did not
intend a
3
foreclosure sale upon bankruptcy to require fair market value.
Also, because it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposefully when it includes particular language in a statute, it may be
presumed that Congress did not intend fair market value to be the bench39
mark upon which "reasonably equivalent value" is to be determined.
Even if the definition could be stretched to mean "as close to equivalent as
can reasonably be expected," the Court noted that such "word-gaming"
would deprive the criterion of all meaning."
Thus, without clearer
textual guidance than the phrase "reasonably equivalent value," the Court
refused to presume such a radical departure to "fair market value.""'
B. The Court's Presumption that "FairMarket Value" Does Not Exist
Within the Context of a Forced Sale
The Court in BFP followed the presumption that fair market value does
not exist where there is a forced sale.' 42 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that fair market value presumes market conditions that do not
exist in the forced-sale context. 43 This is because property sold within the

137. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1761. Id. The Court added that the Code "might readily have said
'received less than fair market value in exchange for such transfer or obligation,' or 'less than
reasonably equivalent or fair market value.' Instead, it used . . . the entirely novel phrase
'reasonably equivalent value.'" Id.
138. Id. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, dealing with debtor's exemptions,
specifically provides that, for purposes of that section, "value" means fair market value as of
the date of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). "Fair market value" also appears
in the Code provision that defines the extent to which indebtedness with respect to an equity
security is not forgiven for the purpose of determining whether the debtor's estate has realized
taxable income. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 3460)(7)(B) (Supp. 11 1984).
139. Id. at 1762.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1764 (citing United Say. Ass'n. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988); Midlantic Nat'l. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631 (1993) (statutes
that invade common law must be read with presumption favoring retention of long-established
principles absent evident statutory purpose to the contrary)).
142. Id. at 1758.
143. Id.
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is simply worth
time and manner strictures of a state-prescribed foreclosure
restrictions. 44

less than property sold without such

The Court also looked at the language of section 548(a)(2) ("received

less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange") as requiring judicial
inquiry into whether the foreclosed property was sold for a price that
approximated its worth at the time of sale. 45 "An appraiser's reconstruction of 'fair market value' could show what similar property would be worth

if it did not have to be sold within the time and manner strictures of a stateprescribed foreclosure."146 However, the Court reasoned that property sold

within these strictures is simply worth less. 147 As a consequence, no buyer

real
would pay as much to own such property as the buyer would to own
marketing techniques. 148

estate that could be sold pursuant to normal

IV. THE HARSH IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION:
FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE POLICY BEHIND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Supreme Court in BFP dictated that the price received at a mortgage
foreclosure sale, any price received, conclusively establishes a "reasonably

equivalent value" without the requirement of a fair market value. There are
three fundamental problems with the Court's decision. First, the Court failed

to recognize the purpose of section 548, which is to preserve bankrupt
debtors' estates for fair distribution to all creditors. 49 This purpose
reflects the "concept of avoidance based on the federal policy favoring
maximum distribution to the unsecured creditors of a bankrupt debtor, not

10 It is inherently unfair to
on the blameworthiness of the parties."''
creditors and debtors alike that a significant portion of the value of the single

largest investment which most individuals will ever make is lost during a

144. Id. at 1762. Justice Scalia suggests that specifying a federal minimum sale price
beyond what state foreclosure law requires would extend bankruptcy law well beyond the
traditional field of fraudulent transfers, thus upsetting the coexistence that fraudulent transfer law
and foreclosure law have enjoyed for over 400 years. Id. at 1764.
145. Id. at 1762.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 972 (emphasis added). Professor Ehrlich focuses on both
the creditor who has an interest in the proceeds of the sale and the bona fide purchaser at the
foreclosure sale as parties without blame.
To allow the trustee both to recover the property and to retain the consideration given
by the transferee would result in a windfall to the trustee and a punitive action against
the foreclosure purchaser. Where the transfer is presumptively, not actually,
fraudulent, it is illogical and inequitable to shift the entire burden of avoidance to a
transferee who has merely exercised his state law right to purchase the property at
a state-mandated foreclosure sale.
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foreclosure sale.' 5' However, the Court did not accommodate the purpose
of section 548, which is to focus on the creditor and debtor as protected
parties.1 52 Instead, the Court focused on the bidding party at the foreclosure sale as the protected party.' 53 The majority noted that security of title
to real estate provides an essential state interest, and that the power
to ensure
54
that security "inheres in the very nature of [state] government."
The second problem with the BFP decision is more fundamental. At "a
typical foreclosure sale, a mortgagee has no incentive to bid any more than
the amount of the indebtedness, since any 'surplus' would be turned over to
the debtor (or junior lienholders). . .

.,

Several commentators have

suggested that if state procedures are properly designed to obtain a maximum
price under the circumstances of a forced sale, the courts should presume
that the price received is a realistic reflection of value.' 56 However, even
if this is true, without the requirement of a fair market price the mortgagee
is not motivated
to seek the highest possible price for the foreclosed
57
property.The BFP decision allows a mortgagee to bid at the foreclosure sale for
the amount of the debt and in turn to realize a profit selling the property.
This is especially true where the property is obviously worth more than the
amount of the indebtedness, because the lender is more likely to take the
property by bidding the amount of the indebtedness. 5 8 The result is a twofold loss: (1) the creditors lose their interest in the proceeds of the sale, and
(2) the debtor loses any equity in the foreclosed property.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in BFP follows the
presumption that a foreclosed property must obtain a less-than-fair market
151. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: ForeclosureBy Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosureand Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL
L. REv. 850, 875 (1985).
152. Davis & Standiford, supra note 74, at 232. Still, Davis and Standiford note that while
relief of debtors is a primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, any analysis of the fraudulent
transfer provisions must be based on the purpose of fraudulent transfer laws, which is to remedy
a wrong that a debtor had committed against his creditors. Id.
153. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1764-65.
154. Id.

155. Id. at 1775 (Souter, J.,dissenting). See supra note 40 for a definition of "junior
creditor."
156. Ehrlich, supranote 34, at 979. Professor Ehrlich takes this position on the assumption
that state foreclosure procedures are structured to produce an optimal sale price, while respecting
the lender's need for a low cost realization of the collateral. Id. See also Alan S. Glover &
Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial Foreclosure Process-A Proposal To Reconcile the
Procedures Mandated By State Law With the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061 (1990).
157. See Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 959. Professor Ehrlich suggests that "[t]he lender's aim
is completely inconsistent with the goal of maximizing value." Id. "The lender's only interest
is selling the property at a price equal to the amount of its outstanding debt." Id. This is
because any "surplus" would be turned over to the debtor (or junior lienholder). Id. at 958.
In some cases, it can even be advantageous for the creditor to bid less and seek a deficiency
judgment. See Washburn, supra note 137, at 847-51.
158. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1775 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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value. 1 9 The majority reasoned that because properties sold at a foreclo-

sure sale are "simply worth less," they must have been "worth" whatever

price was paid."6 This pessimistic view effectively leaves the debtor, as

well as the creditor, essentially unprotected when a foreclosure occurs. By
not referring to fair market value as the benchmark against which determination of "reasonably equivalent value" is to be measured, the BFP Court
failed to take the pragmatic approach that the court in Durrett took. The
cornerstone of bankruptcy law has always been achieving equitable results for
creditors. 6 ' Still, the majority in BFP chose to rely on the false presump162
tion that foreclosure sales cannot be expected to yield fair market value.
By relying on this presumption, the Court allowed the price received at the
foreclosure sale, though significantly less than the property's fair market
value, to stand. The Court effectively dismissed the mandate requiring
maximum distribution of the bankrupt debtor's estate for the benefit of
and secured creditors, leaving the creditor and debtor unprotectunsecured
63
ed.

A third problem with the BFP decision is one of the proper construction
of the term "reasonably equivalent value" as it appears in the Bankruptcy

Code," 6 the majority failed to address. If a property's "value" is conclusively presumed to be whatever the highest bid is, as the BFP holding

suggests, the issue of whether the property sold for less than "reasonably
equivalent value" would never be worth addressing. Thus, the bankruptcy

159. Id. at 1761.
160. Id. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986).
162. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1758.
163. Justice Souter, speaking for the dissent, stated his position as follows:
ET]he assessed value of a parcel of real estate at the time of foreclosure sale is not
to be ignored. On the contrary, that figure plainly is relevant to the Bankruptcy Code
determination, both because it provides a proper measure of the rights received by
the transferee and because it is indicative of the extent of the debtor's equity in the
property, an asset which, but for the pre-bankruptcy transfer under review, would
have been available to the bankruptcy estate. It is also somewhat misleading,
similarly, to suggest that 'no one would pay as much' ... for a foreclosed property
as he would for the same real estate purchased under leisurely, market conditions.
Buyers no doubt hope for bargains at foreclosure sales, but an investor with a million
dollars cash in his pocket might be readily to pay 'as much' for a desired parcel of
property on a forced sale, at least if a rival, equally determined millionaire were to
appear at the same auction.
Id. at 1768 n.2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Souter also noted that the principal
reason foreclosure sales yield low prices is not so much that the properties are momentarily
"worth less." Rather, Justice Souter opined that such free-spending millionaires are in short
supply, and those who do exist are unlikely to read the fine print which fills the "legal notice"
columns of their morning newspaper. Id. at 1769.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) ("the trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor.
received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
. .") (emphasis added).
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avoidance power would apparently be a "dead letter" in reviewing real estate

foreclosures. 65 This is incredulous, because if "reasonably equivalent
value" is presumed to be whatever the property sold for, Congress would not
have placed the phrase "reasonably equivalent value" in the Bankruptcy
Code. Instead, Congress would have used the term "value" instead of
"reasonably equivalent value," and defined "value" as whatever the property
sold for."6

V. POLICY REASONS OF DURRE7T: THE ONLY PLAUSIBLE APPROACH
TO PROTECT THE CREDITOR AND DEBTOR

Several commentators have suggested ways to achieve higher prices at
the foreclosure sale. One suggestion is to improve the foreclosure sale by
generating more active participation by third-party buyers. 67 This would
ideally result in more spirited and competitive bidding.'63 Other suggestions include changing the requirement of cash payment at the foreclosure
sale, lessening the chaos of the transaction by changing the forum of the sale,
and improving the brokerage listing services.' 69
These suggestions are not without merit, because they are factors that

might allow for higher prices. However, they do not guarantee an optimal
price will be received for the property. Ultimately, the forced-sale aspect of
the foreclosure proceeding implies that the property will be sold for a

165. Id. at 1770 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. However, two commentators have suggested that "reasonably equivalent value," in
the context of a foreclosure sale, should mean the "value that should reasonably be received at
a properly conducted public sale. This approach would mean that most foreclosure sales would
not be avoidable as fraudulent transfers." See Davis & Standiford, supra note 74, at 230.
167. See Wechsler, supra note 151, at 891. Wechsler suggests that lack of notice about
foreclosure sales may effectively exclude some third parties from bidding, because the notice
required by the typical foreclosure statute do not attract the attention of the general public. Id.
168. Nevertheless, the basic structure of state foreclosure sale procedures favors the lender
and discourages truly competitive bidding. Robert A. Glaves, The Controversy Over Section 548
of the Bankruptcy Code in the Mortgage Arena: Making the Case For a Federal Statute
Reforming the Foreclosure Process, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 683, 692 (1990). Although the
forced nature of a foreclosure sale causes prices to be lower than they might be for a sale of real
property in the open market, the lack of competitive bidding at foreclosure sales is a principal
reason that prices tend to be well below the market value of the properties being sold. Id. State
legislatures inexplicably have resisted structural reform of the foreclosure sale process. The
Uniform Land Transactions Act, adopted in 1975 by the National Conference of Commissioners
on State Laws, contains numerous provisions that would reform the structure of foreclosure
sales. See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 3-508 - 3-509, 13 U.L.T.A. 614-17 (1985)
[hereinafter U.L.T.A.]. However, the U.L.T.A. has not been adopted in any state, although
the New Hampshire Supreme Court has endorsed the concept for nonjudicial power of sale
foreclosures in that state. For a general discussion of the U.L.T.A., see Sunimary of the
Uniform Land TransactionsAct, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 672 (1978). Thus, although
the forced nature of a foreclosure sale causes prices to be lower than they might be for a sale
of real property in the open market, the lack of competitive bidding at foreclosure sales is a
principal reason that prices tend to be well below the market value of the properties being sold.
See Washburn, supra note 136, at 844-55.
169. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 961-62.
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bargain. 7 ' Also, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale often buys the
property subject to several encumbrances, and is unwilling to pay the fair
market price for a property where there might be a cloud on title.171 Thus,
all the advertisements and broker listings in the world will not necessarily

achieve fair market prices."' This is especially true where there is a
statutory right of redemption for the defaulting party, which will necessarily lessen the value. 74
The only plausible approach to achieving a fair market value is the
approach taken by the court in Durrett,and rejected by the Court in BFP.

Under the Durrettrule, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is required to bid
at least seventy percent of the property's fair market value. 75 The most

obvious attribute of the Durrettrule is that it attempts to address the purpose
of section 548 and serve the main purpose of bankruptcy law: the preserva-

tion of the debtor's assets for the distribution to unsecured creditors. By
overriding state law and imposing a "minimum bid" of seventy percent of the

property's fair market value, the creditors secured by the property can be
guaranteed the foreclosure will generate money for the debtor's estate. Thus,

170. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1762.
171. Telephone Interview with Barbara J. Schwartz, Real Estate Broker, Fred Sands
Realtors (Nov. 20, 1994). A cloud on title is
[a]n outstanding claim or encumbrance which, if valid, would affect or impair the
title of the owner of a particular estate, and on its face has that effect, but can be
shown by extrinsic proof to be invalid or inapplicable to the estate in question. A
conveyance, mortgage, judgment, tax-levy, etc., may all, in proper cases, constitute
a cloud on title.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 255 (6th ed. 1990).
172. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1762. "No one would pay as much to own such property as he
would pay to own real estate that could be sold at leisure and pursuant to normal marketing
techniques." Id.
173. See supra text accompanying note 31. Foreclosure sales subject to redemption transfer
a defeasible estate. Exercise of the redemption right terminates the sale and restores the
property to the person who redeemed. The statutory right to redeem is part of the estate if the
person entitled to redeem files a petition under Chapter 7, 11, or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code
during the redemption period. In such event the trustee or debtor-in-possession may exercise
the right of redemption within the period specified in 11 U.S.C. § 108(b). See also CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 729.030 (vest 1995):
The redemption period during which property may be redeemed from a foreclosure
sale under this chapter ends:
(a) Three months after the date of sale if the proceeds of the sale are sufficient to
satisfy the secured indebtedness with interest and costs of action and of sale.
(b) One year after the date of sale if the proceeds of the sale are not sufficient to
satisfy the secured indebtedness with interest and costs of action and of sale.
174. Id. A post-sale right of redemption has an adverse affect on the price received at a
foreclosure sale. Bidders are unlikely to bid for property if they cannot rely on keeping it, or
selling it on the fair market. Put another way, a person would not likely pay $100,000 for a
house that the debtor could reclaim at any time by paying $80,000.
175. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the seventy percent rule of Durrettfacilitates the rehabilitation of debtors and
increases the chances of payment to unsecured creditors.
In addition, the seventy percent rule may provide bidders at a foreclosure
sale more certainty regarding whether a potential bid is likely to be upset in
later proceedings. 76 "The seventy percent benchmark gives the buyer
notice that he must pay at least a minimum amount or take the risk that a
bankruptcy trustee may be able to avoid the sale."'" Such notice provides
an advantage that the case-by-case approach of Bundles does not provide.
Accordingly, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale can be more certain of the
risks of buying property at a price below the seventy percent benchmark than
he would be if the transaction at that price78were subject to a case by case
determination of "reasonable equivalence."
In addition, providing an easily identifiable guideline, as Durrettdoes,
"lend[s] more uniformity to case decisions than if the determination were left
merely to judicial fiat."' 79 As observed by the court in Jackson v. Security
Federal Savings & Loan Association,80 even if appraisals differ, the
seventy percent rule provides a thirty percent cushion that gives the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale some discount for the risks of making a
purchase at such a sale, in addition to eliminating minor differences of
opinion as to fair market value.' 8'
Because Durretteffectively achieves the purpose of bankruptcy law and
provides certainty among the bidding parties, the most recent congressional
enactment dealing with the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,182
favored the Durrettdecision. 3
A. The Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984:
Codification of the Durrett Rule?
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
(Bankruptcy Act of 1984)'" was enacted subsequent to the Madrid and
Durrettdecisions in order to address the Madrid / Durrettproblem. More
specifically, the purpose of the Act was to determine whether fair market

176. Welcott, supra note 1, at 406.
177. Robert Buford, Can Mortgage ForeclosureSales Really Be Fraudulent Conveyances
Under Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 HOus. L. REV. 1221, 1243-44 (1985).
178. Id. at 1244.
179. Welcott, supra note 1, at 406.
180. 76 B.R. 597 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
181. Id. at 599.
182. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 401(1), 463(a), 98 Stat. 368, 370 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 548(a) (1988)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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value or procedural regularity is to be the benchmark upon which "reasonably equivalent value' is to be determined.
In the course of amending the Bankruptcy Code, Congress considered,
but did not enact, an amendment that said precisely what the majority in BFP
now says the current provision means; that the power to avoid a foreclosure
sale is confined to foreclosures involving collusion or procedural irregularity.' 86 The proposed amendment read:

A secured party or third party purchaser who obtains title to an interest of
the debtor in property pursuant to a good faith prepetition foreclosure,

power of sale, or other proceeding or provision of nonbankruptcy law
permitting or providing for the realization of security upon default of the
borrower under a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security agreement

takes 7for reasonably equivalent value within the meaning of this section.'
Had this proposed amendment been accepted, Congress would have
granted an irrebuttable presumption of "reasonably equivalent value" to any
mortgagee or third-party purchaser who purchases mortgaged property at a
regularly conducted foreclosure sale. This would have given the BFP Court
a basis for its decision.
However, in the debate on the floor of the Senate, Senator Metzenbaum
objected to resolving the Madrid / Durrettissue in the bill because this issue
had not been considered in committee.' 88 As a consequence, the bill was
amended to delete this proposed amendment.' 89 Still, the two other
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, which adopted the Durrett analysis of
the "transfer" issue, were left in the bill.' 90 These changes consisted of: (a)
amending the definition of "transfer" in the Bankruptcy Code to specify that
it encompasses the "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption", and
(b) amending section 548 to emphasize its applicability to transfers where the
debtor "voluntarily or involuntarily" receives less than reasonably equivalent
value.' 9' While it might be wise not to attach too much significance to a
legislative "nonoccurrence," "it surely cautions against undue reliance on a
different, entirely speculative congressional 'omission.'
185. 11 U.S.C. § 548(A)(2).
186. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1768 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J.,

dissenting).
187. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 360 (1983).

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.

192. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1768 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). In this case, such caution would be rewarded." Id.

While the assertedly 'standard phrase' 'fair market value' appears
in more than 150 distinct provisions of the Tax Code, it figures in
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Ultimately then, the BFP Court was compelled to choose between two
possible statutory provisions, one omitted from the Amendments and one
included. The included statute authorizes the trustee to avoid involuntary
transfers for less than a "reasonably equivalent value."'' 3 The omitted
proposal precludes such avoidance when "a secured party or third party
purchaser. . . obtains title to an interest of the debtor in property pursuant
to a good faith prepetition foreclosure ...proceeding ...permitting...

the realization of security upon default of the borrower." 94 Congress
made its choice in 1984, by enacting the former alternative into law and not
the latter. 95 The BFP Court made its decision ten years later by giving
weight to an omitted statute.
In fact, the court in Verna v. Dorman (In re Verna)96 was persuaded
that the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 did in fact change the law on
setting aside fraudulent conveyances." The court held that when Congress
added the "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption" to the
Bankruptcy Code, the result was to validate the Durrett analysis. 98 The
court also reasoned that by making the foregoing statutory changes, Congress
overruled the Ninth Circuit decision in Madrid, and validated the analysis of
the Durrett decision." 9 Still, rather than follow legislative mandate, the
majority in BFP relied on a purposefully-omittedstatute.
B. Durrett Rule: A ProperRole For the Courts
At least one commentator has suggested that the approach proposed by
Durrett and its progeny suggests an improper role for the courts. 2"° The
concern is that the courts are not the appropriate entity to determine "reason-

only two Bankruptcy Code provisions, one of which is entitled,
suggestively, 'Special Tax Provisions.' The term of choice in the
bankruptcy setting seems to be 'value,' unadorned and undefined,
which appears in more than 30 sections of the Bankruptcy Code, but
which is, with respect to many of them, read to mean 'fair market
value.'
Id. (citation omitted).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
194. See S.445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 360 (1983).
195. The bill was enacted on July 10, 1984 and all the relevant portions became effective
on October 8, 1984. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
196. 58 B.R. 246 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
197. Id. at 250-51.
198. Id. at 251.
199. Id.
200. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 963.
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able equivalence.""'

This author disagrees. As the dissent in BFP notes,

bankruptcy courts regularly make comparably difficult determinations about
the "reasonably equivalent value" of assets transferred through means other
than foreclosure sales. 2 Because the bankruptcy courts are familiar with
foreclosure sales and local real estate market conditions, they are the most

qualified entity to give the term "reasonably equivalent value" sensible
content in evaluating particular transfers on foreclosure. 3 A trustee seeking avoidance of a transfer under section 548(a)(2) must persuade the
bankruptcy court that the price obtained upon transfer of the property was
unreasonably low. 2'
As in other cases under section 548(a)(2), the
gravamen of such a claim will be that the challenged transfer significantly
and needlessly diminished the bankruptcy estate (i.e., that it extinguished a

substantial equity interest of the debtor and the foreclosing mortgagee failed
to take measures which would have augmented the price realized).

5

Thus, in judging the reasonableness of an apparently low price, it is
necessary for the bankruptcy court to determine whether a mortgagee had

done everything expected to achieve a fair price at the original sale, especially where the mortgagee promptly resells the property at a large profit. 2 6

This determination by the bankruptcy court is made more viable by the
implementation of the Durrett rule.

By allowing a transfer only upon a

showing that the property achieved at least seventy percent of its fair market
value, the decision by the bankruptcy court becomes less discretionary.
Instead, the decision allows for an objective appraisal of what the property
is worth. This can be accomplished, for example, by taking into account the
value of comparable properties in the locality, or by deferring to the testimony of expert real estate appraisers. The assessed value of a parcel of real
201. Id. Professor Ehrlich suggests that "the prospect that trial courts will determine
reasonable equivalence on a case-by-case basis is untenable from both federal and state
perspectives." Id. According to Professor Ehrlich, "[flrom a state viewpoint, an ad hoe
approach produces intolerable uncertainty regarding the finality of any purchase at a foreclosure
sale." Id. "From a federal perspective, this uncertainty undermines the price-maximizing
objectives of section 548(a)(2) because potential buyers will discount their assessment of the true
market value of the property to reflect this uncertainty." Id. at 963-64.
202. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1772 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Covey v.
Commercial Nat'l Bank, 960 F.2d 657, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1992) as an example of the regularity
by which bankruptcy courts determine "reasonably equivalent value." Id. The majority in BFP
conceded that bankruptcy courts regularly make determinations about "reasonably equivalent
value" of assets transferred through means other than foreclosure sales. Id. at 1766. However,
Justice Scalia notes that the vast majority of cases in which the bankruptcy courts determine
.reasonably equivalent value" are non-foreclosure sales. Id. In those cases, the majority
reasoned, the bankruptcy courts can refer to the traditional common-law notion of fair market
value as the benchmark. Id. Still, Justice Souter reasoned that, pursuant to the majority's
argument, the bankruptcy courts would still be required to speculate "as to the price 'that would
have been received if the foreclosure sale had proceeded according to state law.'" Id. at 1773
n.12. (citation omitted).
203. Id. at 1773.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1773 n.13.
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estate provides a proper measure of the rights received by the transferee, as
well as the extent of the debtor's equity in the property. 2°7
The Durrett rule claims only to be a description of what foreclosure
prices have, in practice, been found "reasonable." ' As such, it is consistent with the textual directive that when one value is compared to another,
the transfer may be set aside when one value is unreasonably "less than"
another. 9 Moreover, to the extent that Durrett is said to have announced
a "rule," it could be just as easily understood as "recognizing a 'safe harbor'
or affirmative defense for bidding mortgagees who paid seventy percent or
more of a property's appraised value at the time of sale." 210 Such mortgagees, upon paying seventy percent of the property's fair market value at the
foreclosure sale, will be assured that the sale will not be deemed fraudulent.2 '
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 548(D)(2)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

When a bankruptcy foreclosure sale occurs, three separate interests are
formed: (1) the secured lender strives to recover as much of its loan as
possible; (2) the third-party purchaser seeks to pay the lowest possible price
to gain clear title to the property; and (3) the debtor and trustee wish to get
the best possible price for the property in order to offset all outstanding debts
and rehabilitate the debtor.
To gain continuity within bankruptcy court
decisions and protect the interest of the creditors by maximizing the estate of
the debtor, Congress should amend section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to
implement a policy requiring creditor protection. The proposed amendment
to section 548(d)(2) would equate "reasonably equivalent value" with fair
market value.
Congress should adopt the following proposed language to amend section
548(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code:

207. See supra note 164.
208. BFP, 114 S.Ct. at 1773 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that where a transfer is held to be
fraudulent the trustee may recover the property or the value of the property (i.e. the courtdetermined value of the property less the amount bid at the foreclosure sale) from the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale but has no recovery against a "good-faith" purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). If the court chooses to recover the property from the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and the purchaser has acted in good faith, § 548(c) provides
that the purchaser obtains a lien on the property recovered by the trustee equal to the sale price.
11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988). In addition, § 550(d) provides that the good-faith purchaser at the
foreclosure sale is entitled to a lien for the lesser of either the increase in value resulting from
improvements made by the transferee before reconveyance or the costs of those improvements.
11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1988).
212. Walsh, supra note 86, at 199.
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(2) In this section(E) "reasonably equivalent value" shall be defined as follows for all
nonjudicial foreclosures, judicial foreclosures, and strict foreclosures;
(i) "reasonably equivalent value," within the meaning of
subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, shall be given when the
amount given equals or exceeds seventy percent of the
property's "fair market value;"
(ii) "fair market value" shall be determined by the average of
four independent appraisals of the value of four comparable
properties, as determined by industry standards. A comparale property, under this section, is not a property owned by
a party who has filed a voluntary petition, or a property
owned by a party against which an involuntary petition has
been filed, that is still pending.
The proposed definition of "fair market value" within the Bankruptcy Code
specifically rejects any regard for value of property already the subject of a
pending bankruptcy. If "fair market value" is defined with respect to
comparable properties also the subject of bankruptcy proceedings, the
proposed amendment would simply codify the Court's holding in BFP. Such
an amendment would fail of the essential purpose of maximizing the debtor's
estate, because the value of the foreclosed property would be "reasonably
equivalent" to the value of another foreclosed property. Equity, by its very
definition, would require a result that is fair to the third party purchaser, the
debtor, and the creditor. By paying at least seventy percent of the property's
fair market value, the debtor is guaranteed a price "reasonably equivalent"
to the fair market value of a comparable property, while the purchaser is
guaranteed a fair purchase price for the property. The seventy percent
benchmark gives the buyer notice that he must pay at least a minimum
amount or take the risk that a bankruptcy trustee may be able to avoid the
sale.
The proposed amendment also provides a thirty percent cushion that
gives the purchaser at a foreclosure sale a potential discount for making a
purchase at such a sale. Despite the potential bargain the purchaser is
gaining, equity would also require the debtor to waive his statutory right of
redemption. A purchaser should only be required to pay seventy percent of
the property's fair market value if the purchaser can be assured the property
21 3
will not be redeemed by the debtor in the next year at a lower price.
Thus, Congress should also adopt the following addition to section 548(d) of
the Bankruptcy Code:

213. See supra note 174.
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(3) For purposes of this section, any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property in exchange for reasonably equivalent value, shall
remove from the debtor any statutory redemption privilege.
Without the guarantee of clear title to the property, even a thirty percent
discount will not likely be enough incentive to bid at the foreclosure sale.
Such a discount is of no consequence if the purchaser does not gain
immediate clear title to the property. Without the addition of section
548(d)(3) to the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor will have a right to redeem the
property any time in the next year.2 '4
CONCLUSION: A FORCED SALE CAN BRING
"REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE"

Upon foreclosure, the broad aim of federal bankruptcy proceedings is to
preserve the estates of the insolvent so that there may be an equitable
distribution of assets for the benefit of the creditors. 25 The state's aim
with respect to foreclosures, on the other hand,
is much less
21 6
complex-protecting the purchaser's title to property.
Despite the simplicity of the state's goal, existing state foreclosure law
protects neither the creditor nor the debtor. The only bidder at most
foreclosure sales is the mortgagee,2 7 and the price paid is seldom equivalent to market value. 8 As a response, state legislatures have utilized
methods such as statutory redemption periods to protect the debtor and
creditor. However, such methods have not resulted in increased foreclosure
sale prices.2 9
The proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy Code favors federal
bankruptcy law at the expense of state foreclosure laws. Such favoritism
might be frowned upon by the respective state seeking finality to the sale.
However, where there is a bankruptcy, such favoritism is acceptable. In the
Bankruptcy Code, the policy of encouraging stability and finality of title has
a secondary position to the policy favoring protection of equity for the
creditor. The proposed amendment provides an incumbency upon the courts
to rely upon the equitable principle involved in bankruptcy law: the
preservation of bankrupt debtors' estates for fair distribution to all creditors.
Within this principle is the requirement to avoid asset-depleting, windfall

214. See supra note 173.
215. See, e.g., Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962).
216. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 979.
217. R. KRAVOTIL & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 41.02 (2d
ed. 1981).
218. See, e.g., Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 233 (1941); In re Richardson,
23 B.R. 434, 446 n. 18 (Bankr. D. Utah) (citing evidence of the poor prices paid at foreclosure
sales).
219. See Washburn, supra note 136, at 938-42.
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transfers.'
The interests of federal bankruptcy law should be favored
over state foreclosure law where the value received at a foreclosure sale does
not adequately protect the interests of the debtor or creditor, and where such
windfalls are allowed to occur.
Unfortunately, the majority in BFP failed to appreciate the fact that the
BFP case arose under the Bankruptcy Code, where the policy of creditor
protection is distinct from the policies of state debtor-creditor law, and
should be favored over the state's interest in finality. This policy should be
reflected in how courts define "reasonably equivalent value."
The controversy which surrounds avoiding mortgage foreclosures as
fraudulent transfers is not one that is easily dispelled. Ultimately, the
justification for avoiding a transfer under section 548(a) would be the unfair
impact the transfer would have on the creditor. Given the inadequate
protection provided by state foreclosure law, a statutory requirement of a fair
market value is the only guarantee of protection for the creditor and debtor.
David P. Schwartz*

220. Ehrlich, supra note 34, at 980.
* Thanks to my parents for their love and support.
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